

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

INFORMATION

August 1, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM:

A. W. Marshall *AW*

SUBJECT:

Lunch with PFIAB, Friday, 3 August

You are scheduled to have lunch with the PFIAB on board the Sequoia at 12:30 p.m. Friday, 3 August. Talking Points are attached at Tab A. A letter from Admiral Anderson suggesting topics for your discussion with the Board is at Tab B.

MORI per pp 1, 2 & 5-9 C05124677

NSC/PFIAB Review Completed

BACKGROUND

This is the first meeting of the newly reconstituted Board. Because this is a natural occasion to restart and reorient their efforts, to overcome past problems, a good deal of attention has been focused on the program for the two-day meeting. Since they will not meet with the President, the hope is that you will provide some of the guidance they sought from the President.

Admiral Anderson's letter reflects some of the Board's concerns with respect to:

- Lack of contact with the President and you.
- Lack of assurance that their studies and advice reach the President.
- Whether they are serving the President well, whether they are doing what he most wants them to do.

His letter specifically suggests that in your discussion you cover the following topics:

- Which areas and what aspects of U.S. foreign relations will require substantial intelligence support in the next few years?

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-- What is your appraisal of Soviet and Chinese objectives vis-a-vis the U. S. ?

-- What is the impact of economic considerations on U. S. foreign policy and what intelligence is needed?

-- What are the strengths and weaknesses of the intelligence support which the President and your office now receive?

-- How can the Board most effectively operate to support the President?

In dealing with the last question you should be aware of:

-- The question raised by Admiral Anderson in mid-June as to the desirability of occasional Board contact with selected members of the Senate and House who have special cognizance over foreign intelligence matters. The notion is that the Board might be a source of independent and informed judgment the Congress could tap.

-- You sent to Admiral Anderson two suggestions for future Board effort (see Tab C):

- Further review of the Board's recommendations on human source intelligence.

- Assessment of progress toward the goals of the President's reorganization.

Note also the Anderson reference to Ed Land's inclusion on the "enemies list" as a problem.

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HAK TALKING POINTS

Lunch with PFIAB  
August 3, 1973

-- Express your assessment of the importance of the Board's role in advising the President as to objectives, conduct, and management of the national intelligence effort.

-- The need for better intelligence has never been more important. The need for intelligence on Soviet military, political, and economic activities remains high. Of special importance is intelligence information and analysis that would allow us to understand the rationale behind Soviet behavior, the bureaucratic politics of Soviet decision processes.

-- Intelligence relevant to the U.S. -Soviet-Chinese triangular relationship is of special importance. What are the prospects of a Sino-Soviet war? What are the objectives of the Soviets and Chinese with respect to the U.S.?

-- Of growing importance is political and economic information on all countries with which we have substantial relations. Some of this information will have to be collected and analyzed by the intelligence community.

-- What are the strengths and weaknesses of the intelligence support provided to the President and to the NSC? The major areas of strength are the current intelligence reporting and our ability to follow

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Soviet weapons development and deployment. Major areas of weakness are political analysis generally and in particular an inability to provide intellectually respectable explanations of why the Soviets are doing the things they are doing. Our ability to follow what they do has improved a great deal over the past decade, our ability to understand or explain has made no progress. This is particularly acute at the moment in the SALT monitoring area.

-7 How can the Board best serve the President? The past pattern is appropriate. The Board should see the President soon and receive his views on the matter. Important problem areas for Board attentions are:

- Review of the recommendations in the report on human source intelligence, especially as regards their implementation in the light of the domestic political situations.
- Assessment of progress toward the goals of the President's November 5, 1971 reorganization.
- Development of a long-term program to significantly upgrade the intelligence community's capability to supply analyses of key foreign leaders and elites, and of the decisionmaking processes of foreign governments.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

## PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

July 31, 1973

Dear Henry:

Cancellation of the PFIAB's proposed August 3 meeting with the President makes it vitally important that our meeting with you include a discussion of how the Board can most effectively operate to support the President. This is particularly important, since August 2 and 3 will be the first meeting of the Board since the appointment of four new members: Clare Boothe Luce, Leo Cherne, John Foster, and William Galvin.

The Board last met with the President in May 1972, and with you in June of that year. It is important to recognize that this lack of contact, coupled with the long delay in announcing the changes to the Board (from December 1972 to June 28, 1973) fosters an aura of uncertainty in the minds of the members as to their role as Presidential advisors. The departing members voiced sentiments reflecting on the unfortunately distant relationship prevailing between the Board and the President as well as your office. I am concerned that this attitude not become endemic to the Board as a whole. I might add that Dr. Land's apparent inclusion in the White House "enemies list" has left him non-plussed.

I would like to suggest that in your meeting with us you start with a tour d'horizon which highlights those areas and aspects of U. S. foreign relations which, in the next few years, will require substantial intelligence support. Your appraisal of Soviet and Chinese objectives vis-à-vis the U. S. might be one way of discussing these two major areas. The impact of economic considerations on U. S. foreign policy and the intelligence necessary to support these considerations are also important areas to cover. Finally, the Board must learn the strengths and weaknesses of the intelligence support which the President and your office have been receiving, and your appraisal of the modus operandi by which the Board can best meet its obligation to the President.

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
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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
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I understand that you will not be able to meet with us Thursday morning, but that you and General Scowcroft will join us for lunch on the "Sequoia" on Friday, August 3. This should provide an equally appropriate atmosphere for a good working session.

Sincerely,



George W. Anderson, Jr.  
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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June 5, 1973

## MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL ANDERSON


SUBJECT: Future PFIAB Study Efforts

The President has expressed interest in obtaining assessments and advice from the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in two areas. They are:

-- Review of the Board's recommendations in its report on human source intelligence, following discussions with the DCI and other persons involved in their implementation. In particular, the Board may wish to give its advice on the problems of implementing its recommendations, or suggest modifications of the earlier recommendations.

-- Assessment of progress toward the goals of the President's November, 1971 intelligence reorganization, improved management of resources and improved intelligence products.

Later in the year the President wants to meet with the Board to discuss in more detail a program of work for the Board.



Henry A. Kissinger

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